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ABSTRACT
The food crisis of 2007/8, alongside rapid population growth, and the
uncertainties of climate change propelled African agricultural
transformation back into the development mainstream. New
narratives of ‘climate-smart agriculture’ and ‘sustainable intensification’
underlie this contemporary transformation. We present a political
economy analysis of agricultural policy and livelihoods in Malawi,
Tanzania and Zambia, and use this to assess the challenge of
achieving ‘sustainable and inclusive intensification’. We find little
evidence that agricultural institutions have the capacity to deliver
sustainable intensification in agriculture, or that agricultural policy
drives changes in agricultural livelihoods that will make them either
more sustainable or inclusive.
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1. Introduction
The 2012 revision to the FAO World Agriculture Report predicted that if the world
adopted agricultural intensification, in the form of increasing crop production and
higher cropping intensities, there could be a 90% increase in global food production
and that ‘world agriculture should face no major constraints to producing all the food
needed for the population of the future, provided that the research/investment/policy
requirements and the objective of sustainable intensification continue to be priorities’
(Alexandratos and Bruinsma 2012, 20). Such predictions undoubtedly render sustainable
agriculture intensification (SI) as an ‘organising principle’ through which global food and
climate change problems can be solved (FAO 2009a). Moreover, whilst the idea of inten-
sification in agriculture is certainly mainstreamed and is now entrenched in the push for
a second green revolution (Fairbairn et al. 2014; Snyder and Cullen 2014; Tittonell 2014;
Vanlauwe et al. 2014; Mdee et al. 2019), this can mean a narrow focus on technical inter-
ventions to increase production, and an unclear and contested relationship with the nor-
mative goal of ‘sustainability’.
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This paper explores the gap between the compound and normative goal of ‘inclusive
sustainable intensification’ and the actual practice of agricultural policy and livelihoods
in Malawi, Tanzania and Zambia. Our argument is developed using a political economy
analysis, to review relevant policies and recent research evidence from all three countries,
triangulated through key informant interviews. Our starting point is the research question
posed by the Policy for Equity in African Agriculture project, on sustainable intensification1:
How can equity issues be best addressed in Sustainable Intensification approaches and pol-
icies to ensure the needs and interests of poorer smallholders, especially youth and
women, are properly addressed?
This paper emerges from baseline research to support this donor-funded project in explor-
ing how sustainable intensification interventions could also address concerns of equity
and disadvantage. The term ‘inclusive’ is deliberately deployed in this paper to cover
issues of equity and differentiation in agricultural policy and livelihoods, and we take an
intersectional view of differentiation, rather than the more simplistic identity labelling
(of ‘youth’ or ‘women’) implied in the question above (see Andersson Djurfeldt, Dzanku,
and Isinika 2018; Doss et al. 2018). The paper has three main sections. Section one analyses
the normative goal of inclusive sustainable intensification (ISI), noting that the concept of
sustainable intensification itself is slippery and contested. Through a critical political
economy analysis of agricultural policy and practice in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), we
argue that there is a significant gap between the normative aim of ISI and the actual
dynamics and narratives at play in agricultural policy and livelihoods. We illustrate this
with three areas of critical debate: control over land; rent-seeking and political capture
of food production; and identity-based narratives of inclusion (just add women and
youth). In section two, through a political economy analysis of agriculture policy and prac-
tice in Malawi, Tanzania and Zambia, we show that inclusive sustainable intensification is
far from being mainstreamed and implemented. Our conclusions are based on literature
review, a meta-analysis of previous data collection by the research team and sup-
plemented with key informant interviews undertaken from November 2017 to February
2018. Finally, we assess the considerable barriers to the implementation of ISI in all
three countries. Our findings highlight the substantial gap between normative donor-
driven discourse on the nature of agricultural transformation and the actual dynamics
of agricultural policy and livelihoods in all three countries.
2. The prospects for inclusive sustainable intensification
Sustainable intensification (SI) is a debated term, given the intensely slippery nature of
‘sustainability’ as a discursive and normative construct (Loos et al. 2014; Petersen and
Snapp 2015). For Pretty, Toulmin, and Williams (2011, 7)
… .. it is defined as producing more output from the same area of land while reducing the
negative environmental impacts and at the same time increasing contributions to natural
capital and the flow of environmental services.
1The project is funded by the UK Department for International Development under the programme Sustainable Agricultural
Intensification Research and Learning in Africa (SAIRLA) https://sairla-africa.org/. The Policy for Equity in African Agricul-
ture project is led by Lund University under the AFRINT project https://www.keg.lu.se/en/research/research-projects/
current-research-projects/afrint.
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The Policy for Equity in African Agriculture research project focuses on analysing patterns
of smallholder intensification with a focus on how women, youth and institutions can be
incentivised to increase the intensity of agricultural production on existing land holdings
using methods which do not cause environmental degradation, rather than the extensive
cultivation of new land areas. Population growth and increase in land pressure are often
characterised as directly proportional (Boserup 1965) and this argument underpins argu-
ments for intensified production. However, we should remember the caution of Sara Berry
(1993, 189) that:
Agricultural intensification has been neither inevitable nor continuous in African farming
systems. In some areas, intensification was halted or reversed by changing environmental
or political and economic conditions; in others, it has occurred not as an adaptive response
to population growth or commercialisation, but in the face of growing labour shortages
and declining commercial activity. Such cases underscore the importance of studying
farming as a dynamic social process. As farmers contend with social as well as environmental
conditions, changes occur not only in what is produced and howmuch, but also in when work
is done and by whom. Thus, changes in cropping patterns and methods of cultivation are
influenced by social factors which govern the timing as well as the amounts of labour
devoted to farming, as well as the control of effort and output.
There is little agreement in either policy or academic literature on precisely what sustain-
able intensification consists of (Garnett et al. 2013; Wezel et al. 2015; Bernard and Lux
2017; Béné et al. 2019). Hence sustainable intensification can both denote efforts to
improve agricultural output levels per unit area by increasing the use of more efficient
external outputs and technological advances; and conversely the promotion of organic
and conservation agricultural techniques with the reduction of external inputs. It
remains unclear what SI is precisely, rather there is an open aspiration of ‘what it
might look like’, hence it embraces different approaches that enable the fulfilment of
the broader goal (Garnett and Godfray 2012; Garnett et al. 2013). Such approaches can
include but are not limited to: new and conventional techniques to increase water, nutri-
ent and other input efficiencies, development of new varieties or breeds of crops and
livestock, conservation agriculture (reduced tillage/no till, soil cover and soil recovery
strategies), integrated pest management (IPM), and agroecological approaches. Impor-
tantly, the breadth of SI discourse allows policymakers to integrate multiple goals and
repackage existing policy and interventions under the concept (Loos et al. 2014). In
this paper we don’t intend to add further to attempts to define SI, rather we are inter-
ested in the deployment of the concept in donor-funded agricultural interventions and
how this sits at odds with the dominant narratives and concerns of policymakers, civil
servants, farmers in Malawi, Tanzania and Zambia. Further, we seek to interrogate the
notion that SI can also be inclusive.
The incentives, opportunities and obstacles for actors to promote (or discourage) agri-
cultural intensification are related to both the political economy of development processes
and a range of, often conflicting, national, regional and international policies and pro-
grammes. Institutional change processes and agricultural dynamics may lead to either
inclusionary or exclusionary tendencies, e.g. small farmers may become landless if national
policies favour agri-business investment (Vorley, Cotula, and Chan 2012; Tsikata 2016; Hall,
Scoones, and Tsikata 2017; Chinsinga and Chasukwa 2018a; Manda, Dougill, and Tallontire
2018a, 2018b).
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In addition, the adoption of inclusive sustainable intensification as a normative
approach and outcome for agriculture in SSA would be subject to the agreement on
such a vision by a multitude of different actors, with often competing interests and
agendas. The barriers to this are obvious: donors remain confused about how to
package, coordinate and deliver intervention to accelerate agriculture development
(Mdee et al. 2019); and there are inconsistencies between global, regional and local pol-
icies on land governance and approaches to agriculture development (Chinsinga and
Chasukwa 2012). Government budgetary spending and commitment to agriculture is
rising but remains low in Africa (FAO 2009b, 2018); corporate investments are reproached
for their unclear investment motives and destabilising relationship with smallholder
farmers (Dubb, Scoones, and Woodhouse 2017) and smallholder farmers remain
trapped in between the politics and dynamics of competing interests (Manda, Dougill,
and Tallontire 2018a, 2018b). There is also little agreement from mainstream develop-
ment partners on what sustainable agriculture looks like (Mdee et al. 2019). The contra-
dictions among actors involved in agriculture development have historical origins hence
it is important to understand the foundation of current agricultural policies in colonial
regimes.
It is suggested that development partners and governments have a responsibility to
create an enabling context of macro policy that could support inclusive and sustainable
agricultural intensification (Pretty, Toulmin, and Williams 2011). In sub-Saharan African
at a more meso-level, sub-national agricultural institutions and actors (including extension
services, farmer organisations, traders, investors in contract farming, input suppliers and
local authorities who control land tenure systems) are some of the most important
mediators that determine the extent to which agricultural policies contribute to inclusivity
and sustainability in existing agricultural dynamics. The resources and capabilities present
at the meso-level have a critical role in enabling policy and strategy to be implemented
and where resource and capability gaps are present, then the gap between stated
policy and practice can be wide (Andrews, Pritchett, and Woolcock 2013; Mdee and
Harrison 2019). At the micro level, farmers operate in a space in which they implement live-
lihood strategies in a context shaped by formal institutions, but also through more socially
embedded customary arrangements (Harrison and Mdee 2017b).
It is apparent that the visibility of small-scale ‘peasant’ farmers in either colonial or post-
colonial visions for agricultural transformation in Africa has been limited, presenting them
as a problem to be solved, or a resource to be exploited (Birner and Resnick 2010). Birner
and Resnick’s (2010) comparative political economy of agriculture policies in Africa and
Asia argues that transformation of smallholder agriculture is not the focus of agricultural
policy in SSA, despite their dominance in the agricultural sector, given the policy maker’s
preference for ‘modernised’ and commercial agriculture. However, large agriculture-
dependent populations also need to be politically manipulated where democratic elec-
tions have been adopted (Bates and Block 2009) and where public spending on staple
crops permeates political dynamics. This is pronounced in many subsidy programmes
(Chirwa and Chinsinga 2012). We are conscious that there is an extensive literature on
rural development and transformation, particularly relating to class formation and differ-
entiation (for example Bernstein 2016), but focus our attention in this article on contem-
porary agricultural policy dynamics and capacity for implementation.
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To what extent is it likely that this wide range of actors and interests will align on the
normative goal of ISI? A critical examination of the literature on the political economy of
agriculture in SSA suggests that this outcome is unlikely. In this section, we highlight three
critical challenges to the normative goal of ISI: the scramble for ‘surplus’ land in Africa; the
dominant narrative of agricultural modernisation/industrialisation and the politicisation of
food crops; and the politics of identity in shaping the ‘inclusiveness’ of agricultural policy.
2.1. Challenge 1- the scramble for ‘surplus’ land
A narrative of agricultural intensification is frequently used as a justification to explain the
motives behind large-scale land acquisition (LaSLA) in some sub-Saharan African countries
by companies and external state interests (Engström and Hadju 2019). The argument is
that such investment will ensure increased production, food security and wider agricul-
tural transformation. Jayne, Chamberlin, and Headey (2014) suggest that the 2008 world
food price crisis propelled a concerted effort to transfer land from customary tenure to
the state or private individuals who, it was assumed, would more effectively realise the
production potential of the land to meet national and global food objectives. This techni-
cal narrative of efficiency, often obfuscates the politics of agriculture and land access in
order to frame answers to the question of ‘who will make the best use of Africa’s land?’
(Manjengwa, Hanlon, and Smart 2014).
A counternarrative suggests that these investments pose challenges for smallholder
farmers and the food security (Dell’Angelo et al. 2017; Hall, Scoones, and Tsikata 2017).
Modern ‘land-grabs’ have historical precedents. Africa has been the target of large land
acquisition and investment, especially during colonial periods. Past and present waves
of land reallocations/acquisitions focus on customary or ‘unused’ lands (Doss, Summerfi-
eld, and Tsikata 2014; Hall, Scoones, and Tsikata 2017; Kuusaana 2017). Allocations of
land to incoming investors (either foreign or local) are often predicated on the assumption
that there is spare and unproductive land, while land demarcations and designations are
contested terrains. There is evidence in all our focus countries that estimates of spare land
are exaggerated, and that almost all land is subject to claims of one kind or another, be
they from the state, settlements, individual landowners or land users (see Chinsinga and
Chasukwa 2012; Sitko and Chamberlin 2016; Bluwstein et al. 2018).
Where the state seeks to invest in agricultural transformation through ‘modernisation’
of agriculture then this can favour the commercial and corporate investor, and local elites,
who use their power and resources to dispossess others of their access to resources (see,
for example, Tsikata 2016; Kuusaana 2017; Bluwstein et al. 2018). This is reflected in the
observed increasing differentiation of agricultural livelihoods across Africa (Hall,
Scoones, and Tsikata 2015; Andersson Djurfeldt and Hillbom 2016; Andersson Djurfeldt,
Dzanku, and Isinika 2018). Current patterns suggest that this process may be driving a
new wave of marginalisation and dispossession.
2.2. Challenge 2- the politics of agricultural ‘modernisation’
Agricultural policy in sub-Saharan Africa is dominated by a historical and aspirational nar-
rative of ‘modernisation’, whereby peasant agriculture is subject to transformation
through the consolidation of lands, and the application of ‘modern’ technologies and
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production methods, organised around the potential to generate export revenue (Scott
2002; Bernstein 2010). As already noted above, this drives policy design, which often
does not specifically tackle the challenges of small-scale agriculture (Birner and Resnick
2010; Mdee et al. 2019). A refreshed drive towards ‘industrialisation’ in African government
policy further reinforces this dominant policy narrative (Verdier-Chouchane 2017).
A critical difference is that a post-second world war discourse on agricultural industri-
alisation does not fit the contemporary context, in which industrial agriculture is recog-
nised as a significant contributor to carbon emissions, and environmental degradation.
Despite donor-driven and international finance incentives to adopt a ‘green’ industrial
strategy, this as yet shows little sign of coherent operationalisation, beyond limited
policy statements on the adoption of ‘climate-smart agriculture’, ‘sustainable intensifica-
tion’ and ‘conservation agriculture’ (Arslan et al. 2015; Mdee et al. 2019). As noted
above, there is little agreement on what sustainable intensification in agriculture is, and
critics have argued that it actually represents a significantly contested terrain, in which
influential corporate actors and technology-driven philanthropists (e.g. Gates Foundation)
offer technical solutions with green outcomes (GMOs, drip irrigation, drones and GPS con-
trolled pesticide application), whilst others rooted in a more critical position on food sover-
eignty argue for a more radical reconfiguration of global food chains in the interests of
both producers and the environment (Pretty et al. 2010; Morvaridi 2016; Mdee et al.
2019). There is a growing evidence base that genuine sustainable agriculture (low input,
agro-ecological systems) can deliver intensification and improved livelihoods (Pretty
2001, 2002, 2003; Altieri and Toledo 2011; Altieri, Funes-Monzote, and Petersen 2012;
Rosset et al.2011; Bennett and Franzel 2013; Nyantakyi-Frimpong et al. 2016; Khadse
et al. 2018; Mdee et al. 2019). Yet, the barriers to agricultural policy being shaped by
this evidence are significant (Isgren 2016). It runs counter to a deeply embedded and
hegemonic policy rhetoric, where modernisation is equal to hybrid seeds, inorganic ferti-
lisers, and large-scale mono-cropping (Engström and Hajdu 2019).
This policy rhetoric is built on a political economy of agriculture in which, the rural pro-
ducers (as the backbone of the economy, and through democratisation as voters) can be
embedded, controlled and exploited. In Zambia, for instance, Chapoto, Kabaghe, and Zulu-
Mbata (2015) observe how heightened public expenditure on agricultural subsidies often
coincides with general elections.
Taxation and price controls were common strategies that enabled elite control in the
sector in both colonial and post-colonial eras. Thus, the prevailing basis of agriculture pol-
icies focuses on the dominance of political elites at the expense of small-scale agricultural
development (Poulton 2012).
More overtly, subsidies and support provided for farmers can also act as an indirect
source of funds for campaigns and electoral strategies for winning rural votes (Banful
2011) and serving as quick means to compensate for a lack of longer-term investment
in rural infrastructure (Dorward et al. 2009). It benefits governments to keep the price of
food low for noisy and politically active urban populations, whilst also subsidising pro-
duction for the populous rural voters. Subsidies to agricultural production are frequently
subject to local elite capture in their allocation and may limit sustainability of intensifica-
tion through decreasing cropping diversification, promoting the use of inorganic inputs
and ignoring soil fertility in the long term (Jayne and Rashid 2013; Chapoto, Kabaghe,
and Zulu-Mbata 2015).
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2.3. Challenge 3- the seductive simplifications of identity-based inclusion
Finally, addressing inequality in agricultural policy is framed predominantly through an
identity-labelling approach (e.g. women or youth or vulnerable groups such as people
living with HIV/AIDS). We see this reflected in the question which underpins this paper,
and of course, this is built on substantial foundations in international development
policy (Doss et al. 2018). This is consistent with neo-liberal understandings of poverty
that frame it as an individual problem resulting from identity-based disadvantage,
rather than a more structural product of class relations, resource control and power. The
net effect of this is that in the international development industry, and in the policies
that they influence we see a tendency to tackle inclusion through identity-based labelling.
Therefore, it is argued that ‘women’ or ‘youth’ require special attention in order for them to
overcome disadvantage (Hickel 2014). This may take the form of women or youth specific
projects or targeted inclusion in decision making. However, this approach has significant
weakness in addressing structural disadvantages.
Women, more than youth, have been labelled either as cardboard victims or heroines
(Cornwall 2016). Ironically, at a time when it is argued that patriarchal decision-making
power is declining in rural households, giving way for women and youth to gain more
decision-making power and economic autonomy (Bryceson 2009), broad brush assump-
tions in relation to gender still dominate agricultural policies (Okali 2012). Doss et al.
(2018) identify a number of dominant policy myths such as ‘women produce 60%–80%
of food’. Whilst this statement is used to demonstrate the critical role women play in
food production, they explain that these universalistic phrases, often based on patchy evi-
dence, ignore the diversity of social and gender relations in agrarian households. Whilst
such statements are widely accepted and propagated, they fail to create a meaningful
change through the policies they inform (Okali 2012; Andersson Djurfeldt et al. 2018;
Doss et al. 2018).
Without a more complex understanding of increasing differentiation within and
between rural households, it is unlikely that policy will be able to respond to making agri-
cultural intensification more inclusive (Doss, Summerfield, and Tsikata 2014; Tsikata 2016;
Andersson Djurfeldt, Dzanku, and Isinika 2018).
This is not to say that gender and youth are not important factors in understanding
inclusion and exclusion in agricultural livelihoods. However, they cannot be universalised
and need to be understood as contributory and integrated into dynamics of differen-
tiation, along with many other factors. Current evidence suggests a continued trend of
increasing differentiation and class formation in agricultural dynamics (Jayne, Chamberlin,
and Headey 2014). It is not enough to address this dynamic through identity-based inter-
vention, rather state and political institutions have to address the consequences for those
who are impacted negatively by current agricultural dynamics, such as those rendered
landless (Snyder and Cullen 2014).
3. Assessing evidence for inclusive sustainable intensification in
agricultural policy and livelihoods in Malawi, Tanzania and Zambia
Political economy analysis aims to provide a reasoned explanation for how a current situ-
ation comes to be as it is, in addition to elucidating different actor’s strategies and
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motivations (Jerven 2014; Nyame and Grant 2014). The nature of institutions and how they
shape change is particularly key to understanding how change happens, who influences it
and to what outcomes it has led.
Our analysis is based on the triangulation of multiple secondary and primary data
sources. We began with a literature review of evidence on agricultural policy and
donor intervention in the case study countries, with the purpose of understanding
the broad dynamics of agriculture and how these align with the notion of ISI. This
was substantially informed by the previous work of the authors. Anna Mdee has con-
ducted extensive field research on agricultural livelihoods and natural resources gov-
ernance in multiple locations in Tanzania since 1996 (Toner 2003; Cleaver and Toner
2006; Harrison and Mdee 2017a, 2017b; Mdee 2017; Harrison and Mdee 2018; Mdee
et al. 2019; Mdee and Harrison 2019; Brockington et al. 2019); Michael Chasukwa
has researched and published on the political economy of agriculture and on local
government capacity in Malawi since 2005 (Chinsinga and Chasukwa 2012, 2015,
2018a, 2018b; Chinsinga, Chasukwa, and Zuka 2013), and Simon Manda has
researched and published extensively on agriculture in Zambia, including a recent
three year investigation of large scale land acquisition (Manda, Dougill, and Tallontire
2018a, 2018b, 2019). We also reviewed the AFRINT survey data for each of the
countries and worked in close co-operation with senior researchers from AFRINT
country teams.2 Additional primary data collection was undertaken from November
2017 to February 2018 for the purposes of triangulation. This consisted of key infor-
mant elite interviews with government ministries, universities, NGOs and development
partners both at national and district levels and primary data and focus group discus-
sions with farmers in each country.3 Full details on the background fieldwork are pub-
lished in a series of detailed working papers under the Policy for Equity in African
Agriculture project: https://sairla-africa.org/what-we-do/research/policy-for-equity-in-
african-agriculture-afrint-iv/.
3.1. Dynamics of agriculture in Malawi, Zambia and Tanzania
Notwithstanding the specificity of the detailed context of each of these three cases and
variations in terms of politics, socio-economic conditions and agriculture policies, it is
possible to identify a set of common trends and themes. This section should be read in
conjunction with Table 1 which provides a synthesis of evidence on trends in agricultural
policy and livelihoods.
All three countries share commonalities of colonial engagement, post-independence
state-led agricultural investment, followed by structural adjustment and liberalisation,
moving to a current concern with the ‘African green revolution’, large-scale commercial
investment, and climate-smart agriculture. The discourse of agricultural modernisation is
present in all three countries. Whilst these policy directions are heavily influenced by
2AFRINT is a multi-country longitudal study of agricultural dynamics in 8 African countries, based on household surveys:
https://www.keg.lu.se/en/research/research-projects/current-research-projects/afrint.
320–30 key informant interviews were conducted in each country – purposively sampled to cover the perspectives of gov-
ernment ministries, agricultural extension workers, local, nation and international NGOs, development partners (inc
World Bank and faith-based organisations). Numbers of focus groups varied by country and in relation to existing
data sets. Focus groups differentiated participants by gender and were used to do a cross check on the themes emerging
from key informant interviews.
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Table 1. Dynamics of agricultural change in Malawi, Zambia and Tanzania.
Era Pre-colonial Colonial era
Independence
– structural
development
Structural adjustment and PRSP
1985–2000 – transition to multi-
party democracy
MDGs 2000–2015
Debt relief Highly indebted
poor countries SDGs 2015
Agricultural
Policies
None Extensification
Plantations
Codification and taxation of
customary lands
Enforcement of patriarchal
norms from UK e.g. on
property ownership
Modernisation of
agriculture colonial
extraction
Malawi and Zambia – more
settler agriculture and
segregation of
subsistence production
State led investment
Nationalisation
Agricultural
subsidies
State led co-
operatives
Modernisation of
agriculture for
state-building
- Tanzania-
collectivisation
- Malawi and
Zambia- elite
accumulation
Zambia – significant
mining activity
in economy,
migration
Removal of subsidies
Dismantling of parastatal and
co-operatives
Liberalisation- requiring
agricultural modernisation for
market-driven growth
Re-emergence of subsidy (Zambia/
Malawi)
Agriculture Research heavily
underfunded (market-led
international research institutes
take over e.g. seed companies)
Gradual freeing up of
agricultural markets
Greater access to inputs for
those who can pay
Liberalisation- stimulating
agricultural modernisation for
market-driven growth and
attracting foreign investment
Land reform (land grab?)
Significant subsidy in Malawi
and Zambia
Public-Private Partnership
New outgrower schemes
Intensification (new green
revolution)
Climate smart agriculture
and sustainable
intensification
Missing potential from
irrigation
Industrialisation-
underpinned by
agricultural
transformation
Key actors Customary arrangements
Arab traders (Tanzania)
Early commercial interests
Colonial authorities
Tribal authorities
Commercial investors
Government
donors, esp World
Bank
Tribal Authorities
(but banned in
Tanzania)
Government (but significantly
reduced state investment)
Donors
Private sector and civil society
growth
Tribal Authorities (Zambia and
Malawi)
Government – poverty
reduction strategy
Donors (with increasing
influence from China)
Private sector (increasing
influence from South Africa)
and civil society growth
Government – new
industrialisation and
climate change
challenge
Donors
Private sector and civil
society actors
(Continued )
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Table 1. Continued.
Era Pre-colonial Colonial era
Independence
– structural
development
Structural adjustment and PRSP
1985–2000 – transition to multi-
party democracy
MDGs 2000–2015
Debt relief Highly indebted
poor countries SDGs 2015
Agricultural
outcomes
Peasant and pastoral
societies
Mainly peasant and
pastoral mode with some
large schemes – e.g. sisal
and groundnuts, tobacco
Outcomes disputed
– failure of some
co-operatives
Disruption of
peasant mode in
some places
Peasant mode
underpins food
security
Zambia – more
urbanisation and
migration; mining
Agricultural decline and soil
degradation – food production
keeps up with population
expansion
Diversification of livelihoods
increasing off-farm income
(deagrarianisation)
Zambia – copper price decline
Agricultural growth – but
limited
Urban expansion- migration
Continued increase of off-farm
income
Tz – high growth sectors:
mining, construction
Zambia – commodity price
boom
No clear story – except of
differentiation
Extensification in some
areas
Decline in some areas
Intensification in some
areas
Inclusion of
women and
youth
Women and youth
embedded in customary
relations these are not
uniform, unfixed or
unchanging
Imposition of patriarchal
laws from UK
Taxation requires increased
waged work
Increasing home
production burden on
women and youth
Critical role of
women within
liberation
movements
Youth leagues
Increasing access to
education
Beijing Declaration on Rights of
Women 1995
Special seats and women’s
representation (Tanzania – 30%
quotas)
Increasing influence of NGOs
working on women’s rights
SAPs cause decline in access to
education and other public
services
African Youth Charter 2006
Increased visibility of women in
education and formal
employment
Legal reform on ownership
giving women rights to land
Civil society focus on women –
access to loans
Educated Youth
unemployment
Increased youth interest in
commercial agriculture
(for those with
resources)
Increasing debt levels
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donors, the politics involved is complex. The aim of dominant political regimes of both
colonial and post-colonial eras favours full-scale agricultural transformation, meaning
the shift of labour from agriculture, and a concentration of land-holdings, through inten-
sification and commercial investment; but this goal has remained elusive across the case
study countries. Whereas the share of agriculture in GDP may be declining to variable
degrees, small-scale agriculture remains highly significant in the livelihoods of most of
the population (Manjengwa, Hanlon, and Smart 2014; Harrison and Mdee 2018). All
three countries are experiencing large-scale land acquisition and increasing differentiation
of rural wealth (Andersson Djurfeldt and Hillbom 2016; Chinsinga 2017; Chung 2017; Bluw-
stein et al. 2018). Whilst decentralisation shapes the governance agenda of all three gov-
ernments, the process is incomplete, and local government support to agriculture is
under-resourced and fragmented (O’Neil et al. 2014; Mdee, Tshomba, and Mushi 2017).
Tanzania abolished ‘traditional authorities’, but they retain a central role in agricultural
governance in Malawi and Zambia (Manda, Dougill, and Tallontire 2019).
Malawi, Zambia and Tanzania in this era of new green revolution have implemented
state reforms through policy and donor-funded programmes geared towards accelerating
modernisation and commercialisation of agriculture through Private-Public Partnership
(PPP) approaches. In Tanzania, the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania
(SAGCOT) Programme, an investment strategy under Kilimo Kwanza (Agriculture First)
aims to focus investment and commercialisation of agriculture in the central zone.
However this has created space for local elites and companies to accumulate land and
prosper at the expense of vulnerable groups and small producers (Chung 2017; Rasmussen
and Lund 2018; Engström and Hajdu 2019). Similar criticisms are made of large-scale land
acquisitions and PPPs such as the Green Belt initiative in Malawi (Chinsinga 2017), and the
farm block initiative and out-grower schemes in Zambia (Sitko and Jayne 2014; Matenga
2017). Land policy in all three cases has similarities of duality with customary or collective
tenure sitting alongside more formal systems of individual ownership. Again, there is exist-
ing broad literature on this that supports our analysis, and this is further confirmed in
fieldwork and is explored in the next section. There is some evidence in all three countries
that differentiation in land holdings is growing, and that exploitation of customary land is
being enabled by traditional and other local leaders (Peters 2013; Andersson Djurfeldt and
Hillbom 2016; Chinsinga 2017; Matenga and Hichaambwa 2017; Bluwstein et al. 2018:
Manda, Dougill, and Tallontire 2019).
The shape of the economy as a whole is critical to the agricultural sector. The three
countries in our study all have a large population base who derive a considerable pro-
portion of their livelihoods from agriculture. However, there are differences relating to
the size of land holdings and the shape of the wider economy. In Zambia, the mining
sector underpins significantly more urbanisation than in Malawi or Tanzania. However,
wider economic growth in mining, tourism and construction has also driven urbanisation
in Tanzania. Malawi remains dependent on agricultural production for export revenue. The
poorest households in all three countries depend on rain-fed agriculture, but strategies of
migration and family network remittances are critical to their livelihoods (Andersson Djur-
feldt, Dzanku, and Isinika 2018).
Malawi and Zambia both maintain high levels of state spending on input subsidies in
the face of protracted donor opposition. These are politically important programmes and
the focus of considerable debate, relating to their design, impact, and political capture
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(Sitko et al. 2017). For the past decade, FAO data has demonstrated increases, to different
degrees, in central government expenditure in agriculture in all three countries (see Figure
1) which may partially relate to the adoption of the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture
Development Programme (CAADP). Relative to government expenditures on sectors
such as education and road infrastructure, spending on agriculture has not necessarily
increased as a proportion of total government expenditure.
Gender and youth as categories of inclusion are present in the form of ‘policy noise’,
workshops, committee quotas (very common in Tanzania) and groups. However, in all
three cases, the greatest frontier of differentiation and exclusion appears to be class-
based, within which gender and youth as categories also have some (but differentiated)
significance.
In all three countries, donor and NGO intervention in agriculture is seen as confused,
contradictory, driving elite capture, and supporting corruption. This view is repeatedly
emphasised by elite interviewees in all sectors (government, NGOs and private). In
Zambia, for example, this manifests itself in poor coordination of large-scale foreign
investments in agriculture. This highlights a gulf between policy in theory and
implementation capacity in practice. Analysis using the wider literature on local
service delivery and governance underlines this case (e.g. Mdee, Tshomba, and
Mushi 2017 on Tanzania). All three countries exhibit a critical lack of implementation
capacity in local government support to agriculture and are forced to attempt ‘gap-
filling’ through donor-funded projects. The outcome of this is an ad-hoc short term
and fragmented approach that does not support longer term institutional capacity
development. This is emphasised in elite interviews and reconfirmed in fieldwork at
district levels. For example, in Malawi, a key informant at the local council made the
observation: ‘we do not get enough resources from central government. The only way
Figure 1. Trendline graph showing central government expenditure on agriculture in Malawi, Zambia
and Tanzania (FAOSTAT data, 2018).
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for us to be visible on the ground is to accept being involved in projects implemented by
NGOs. We go by what they want us to do because it is a project’.4
Our research shows that irrigation development is seen as a critical component of agri-
cultural modernisation. This again reflects government (with donor support) priorities of
encouraging public-private investment in irrigation infrastructure – though state-led
expansion remains slow (Manda, Dougill, and Tallontire 2019), farmer-led irrigation is
expanding rapidly (Mdee and Harrison 2019). There is inadequate implementation
capacity (even where there are comprehensive policy frameworks) for managing con-
tested water use, and water scarcity is a growing concern (Harrison and Chiroro 2017; Har-
rison and Mdee 2018).
In Malawi and Zambia, state subsidy and market controls have significant impacts on
driving maize production, although both countries are attempting to diversify their
schemes (Hanjra and Culas 2011; Mpesi and Muriaas 2012; Mason, Jayne, and Mofya-
Mukuka 2013). In Tanzania, the government subsidises maize through an input voucher,
but on a much smaller scale (Gabagambi, Mkangwa, and Kadeng ‘uka 2015). It does intervene
through the setting of tariffs and import/export bans on particular goods. These can be erratic
and have significant impacts on markets in some cases, and we will explore this further below.
Evidence in all three countries suggests that access to reliable and fair markets remains
a challenge for small farmers, even when they successfully increase their production
(Chirwa and Chinsinga 2012; Matenga and Hichaambwa 2017; Harrison and Mdee 2017b).
From our analysis in Malawi, Tanzania and Zambia, we identify three key challenges that
will need to be addressed if inclusive sustainable intensification is to be achieved:
1. Closing the gap between policy in theory and policy implementation in
practice. 2. Addressing the role of maize and agricultural subsidies, and 3. Addressing
the dynamics of elite capture in land and water acquisition.
3.2. The policy-practice gap
Malawi, Tanzania and Zambia have extensive policy frameworks relating to agriculture and
related areas – such as irrigation, climate change, gender, etc. With donor focus on ‘good
governance’-driven institutional change over the last decade, considerable resources and
incentives have been in place to create policy and make ‘policy noise’. There is significant
evidence of ‘isomorphic mimicry’ in creating a policy architecture that has the appearance
of reform, without having the capability and capacity to implement extensive change
(Andrews, Pritchett, and Woolcock 2013; Mdee and Harrison 2019).
How things work in practice is different from the neat intentions set out in policies. The
reasons for this are multiple – relating to the creation of policy in vacuums in central gov-
ernment and elite levels, the hierarchical tendencies of government bureaucracy, the prac-
tical politics of power and patronage, and significant resource constraints (see Mdee,
Tshomba, and Mushi 2017 for a detailed exploration of this in the Tanzanian context).
In Zambia, recent evidence shows that ‘whilst possibilities for LaSLAs are created by state
institutions, the state agencies seeking to administer land-based resources also limit their
potential through competing authority and agendas’ (Manda, Dougill, and Tallontire
2019, 194).
4Key informant interview, Dedza, Malawi.
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An academic interviewee in Malawi also illustrates this issue:
The National Agricultural policy processes demonstrate that policies in Malawi involve mul-
tiple stakeholders, multiple arenas and multiple levels. This has significant implications for
the level of coordination and coherence required to achieve the desired goals and objectives
of any policy process. The level of complexity varies depending on the nature of the specific
policy. The challenges demonstrate that policy and policy-making is conditioned and shaped
by the political, social and economic context, as well as historical factors. It is also important to
note that there is a lack of an internal sense of urgency to systematically address policy chal-
lenges within the government. This implies that the government is not proactive when it
comes to initiating processes leading to the development of relevant policy documents.
Almost always, policy processes are a reaction to international pressures and implemented
on a project basis. Ministry or departmental led policy processes can be overshadowed by pol-
itically orientated policy pronouncements. There is often a sense of urgency to do something
about these policy pronouncements since they may relate to political profiles for electoral pur-
poses and are, usually, at the expense of other equally pressing policy processes and priorities.
(Key informant Interview-Malawi 2018)
This view is consistently confirmed in interviews with representatives from government,
NGOs, academics and donors (off record comments by local staff).
Aid is weakening everybody- we need to kick out the donors. There is so little capacity to
implement the policies that are designed by them. In the end, the Districts just rely on
NGOs to do anything. (Key informant interview, Malawi 2018)
For inclusive sustainable intensification in agriculture to be realised, policies will be
required that start with agricultural conditions and resources as they are, and not as
they are wished to be. This will require closing the gap between policies that exist in
theory (only on paper) and those that can be actually implemented in the context of avail-
able resources. For example, Tanzania has a complex legislative framework for the man-
agement of water resources but is chronically lacking in capacity to implement them
(Harrison and Mdee 2017b).
3.3. The politics of maize
In all three countries, maize remains a key staple food crop for both urban and rural dwell-
ers, and thus is politically significant. The elevation of crops such as maize into a political
food crop is predominant in Malawi and Zambia and presents itself as a form of social con-
tract between the government and citizens (Banful 2011; Hanjra and Culas 2011; Mpesi
and Muriaas 2012; Jayne and Rashid 2013; Chinsinga and Poulton 2014; Kato and
Greeley 2016; Morgan et al. 2019). The dominant political narrative is that adequate
maize availability translates into food security. These forms of social contract limit the gov-
ernment’s spending on other food crops and broader agricultural transformation initiat-
ives and are fulfilled by the government in the form of inputs subsidy programmes and
policies, consumer and producer price controls and marketing strategies, and these
have significant impacts on farmers’ crop choice and production practice. Morgan et al.
(2019) confirm our findings that such subsidies disincentivise production methods associ-
ated with sustainable intensification.
In Malawi, key informant interviews confirmed that not only are policy programmes like
the Farmer Inputs Subsidy Program (FISP) problematic and subject to political manipu-
lation, but they are also trapping smallholder farmers in maize production. Moreover,
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when the government establishes a parastatal agency that purchases a single food crop
for farmers, it demonstrates the level of importance of the crop relative to other crops.
In Zambia, the Food Reserve Agency (FRA) and FISP budgets dominate other agricultural
expenditure in the country (Jayne and Rashid 2013). FRA purchases maize from farmers
above the current market/privatized wholesale prices and deposits maize purchased
into commercial mills. In Tanzania, the use of input subsidies is less extensive than
Malawi and Zambia, however it is noted that the National Agriculture Input Voucher
System (NAIVS) was subject to political demands for extension to certain strategic
locations of the country (Gabagambi, Mkangwa, and Kadeng ‘uka 2015).
Hence, whilst providing input subsidies for maize might target crop productivity
improvement, it also creates political and financial incentives for farmers to keep produ-
cing maize with inorganic inputs, (NPK fertilisers), for governments to manipulate rural
voters, and for fertiliser importers and agro-business dealers to benefit from government
contracts (Jayne and Rashid 2013). Additionally, there are potentially negative conse-
quences of increasing the vulnerability of smallholder production to droughts and
pests, and lowering the resilience of production systems (Morgan et al. 2019). In
Zambia, the culture of defining agriculture in terms of maize production has been ident-
ified as stifling wider efforts towards diversification and market participation among local
farmers (Manda, Dougill, and Tallontire 2019). Similarly, the narrative among citizens in
Malawi that ‘food security is maize availability’5 leads political authorities to concentrate
on promoting maize to resonate well with the electorate. It is evident, thus, that the
these narrow subsidy programmes can frustrate efforts for crop diversification and
climate change adaptation interventions (Chinsinga and Poulton 2014).
Key informants in all the three countries suggest that local agro-dealers deliberately do
not stock diverse inputs because they are not profitable (confirmed in multiple interviews
in 2018). An expert on agricultural subsidy in Malawi argued that the subsidy programme
design assumes that agro-dealers should provide a comprehensive agricultural support
system to farmers, including the provision of extension services and through supplying a
range of agricultural inputs. However, in practice this has turned out to be impossible
because of commercialisation of subsidy programmes and the temporary nature of agro-
dealers – with most emerging opportunistically at the start of subsidy programme and
closing the business at the end of the subsidy period. Furthermore, smallholder farmers
in hard-to-reach areas are under-served because agro-dealers do not find any business jus-
tification to operate in less lucrative areas (see also Andersson Djurfeldt, Dzanku, and Isinika
2018). In these difficult-to-reach areas, people maybe systematically excluded because they
are unable to walk long distances to buy farm inputs even if they have vouchers. At the Dis-
trict levels, agricultural extensions officers observed that it is also difficult for government to
regulate agro-dealers and other suppliers because some are politically connected and rep-
resent interests of elites and political powers, and farmers are often at risk of purchasing fake
inputs. Therefore whilst subsidy programmes may be nationwide in design, in practice they
tend to focus on areas of commercial and political significance.
Without explicit recognition of the political incentives and economic interests that drive
subsidy programmes it is difficult to see how governments will shift their focus from these
programmes as their major form of intervention in agricultural livelihoods. It is conceivable
5Key informant, Mulanje District Council.
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that such programmes are redesigned to incentivise practices associated with ISI, but that
will require political will.
3.4. Dynamics of differentiation
There is some evidence from our literature review, and supported through key informant
interviews in all three countries, that differentiation in land holdings is growing, and that
exploitation and appropriation of customary or collectively managed land is being
enabled by ‘traditional’ and other local leaders (Peters 2013; Sitko and Jayne 2014; Sitko
and Chamberlin 2016; Bluwstein et al. 2018; Rasmussen and Lund 2018; Chinsinga and
Chasukwa 2018a). Moreover, there is evidence of elite capture in both land allocations
and agricultural subsidy schemes. The formal systems (such as the distribution of vouchers
or selection of recipients for subsidy) interact with the more informal systems of power.
Elites should not be thought of only as the top political and business elite, but include
the relatively wealthy and more powerful in a local setting. Elite capture contributes to
class differentiation, as those with connections to powerholders access opportunities for
subsidy, capital accumulation and investment (Mdee and Harrison 2019).
Initiatives seeking inclusion of ‘women’ or ‘youth’ should be understood against this
background. It cannot be assumed that institutional arrangements are uniformly discrimi-
natory in relation to gender and generation. Such social relations are dynamic and shifting,
for example in relation to the shape of the wider economy, e.g. if there are significant
waged labour opportunities that can enable men to migrate. The burden of those who
take responsibility for domestic reproduction much greater where the state does not
ensure the provision of basic services, and therefore gendering of labour must be under-
stood in the wider context of the nature of the economy and class differentiation (Fakier
and Cock 2018).
Debates on inclusivity in agriculture often focus on rights to land and accessibility of
inputs for individuals. Many of the NGOs interviewed in this research are targeting
input and productive interventions at women, using a rhetorical narrative of mainstream-
ing gender. Much of the research under this theme disaggregates agricultural production
and practice based on the sex of the ‘household’ head or ‘plot manager’ (Andersson Djur-
feldt et al. 2018). Surveys often assume that the household exists as a formation of one unit
per dwelling. Rather, households are rather more diverse networks of kin and familial
relations with various configurations of resource flows (Brockington et al. 2019).
Farming is more usually a collective undertaking, with a wide range of diverse intra-familial
arrangements for deciding how to go about this and how to share the benefits. In some
parts of Malawi, land inheritance is patrilineal, in other areas matrilineal (see Peters 1997
for example) but such classifications also shift and change. Simply giving individual
women title to land, or access, to inputs cannot be transformational to unequal gender
relations (see also Andersson Djurfeldt et al. 2018). Historical literature suggests that colo-
nial regimes introduced the gender and property norms of the Victorian United Kingdom
along with the capitalist mode of production, and that these then overlaid a multiplicity of
customary arrangements to shape the current landscape of social relations (Mandala 1984;
Peters 1997). Therefore, gender relations and inclusion are far more complex than the
standard government and donor discourse allows, as is asserted here in a key informant
interview with an NGO manager:
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My experience is that when we talk about mainstreaming youth and gender, we have to
unpack these concepts. Representation does not become true mainstreaming. What do
numbers tell us? We have to understand issues of access and control – can our monitoring
really pick this up? Women will tell us in interviews that their husbands make the decisions,
even if that is not the case. That is what they think that they should say (Interview, NGO Pro-
gramme Officer, Malawi January 2018).
The concept of ISI cannot be confined to identity markers (such as gender or youth) as
these mask economic and social relations that shape more complex and nuanced
dynamics that drive inequality and differentiation. Within households and family
farming units, decision-making and benefit sharing is differentiated and potentially disad-
vantages some and advantages others, and this may have elements of gendering (Anders-
son Djurfeldt et al. 2018).
However, key informants in all three countries suggested that the more powerful
drivers of differentiation and inequality are to be found in patterns of land acquisitions,
market access and unstable prices, unequal market inclusion leading to shortage of
credit or debt traps and lack of alternative off-farm employment (Manda, Dougill, and Tal-
lontire 2019).
4. Discussion and conclusion
Our analysis suggests that the normative goal of inclusive sustainable intensification in
agriculture is somewhat divorced from current realities of agricultural policy and practice
in Tanzania, Malawi and Zambia.
Firstly, the capacity of governments and local institutions to deliver coherent and mul-
tiple policies that ISI will require is highly doubtful. There is a very large gap between
policy commitments on paper and the capacity of local institutions to deliver. There is
no clear agreement on what characterises inclusive and sustainable agricultural pro-
duction, and little evidence of coherent or sustained policy implementation to that
affect, outside of donor or NGO funded projects. Agricultural policy remains dominated
by a narrative of technology-driven modernisation and commercialisation, but evidence
of a sustained advance towards that outcome is also limited. Agricultural subsidies are
critical components of this landscape and currently create incentives for maize pro-
duction in particular, and disincentivise the adoption of sustainable practices in agricul-
ture (see Morgan et al. 2019). They also link symbiotically to the dynamics of rural politics
and elections.
Secondly, our strongest conclusion is that agriculture is becoming less inclusive. This is
being driven by the possibilities for elite capture in state subsidies, an increasing ‘middle’
class and elite accumulation of land, as well as donor-corporate-government alliances
favouring large-scale land acquisitions. A renewed policy rhetoric on industrialisation
might assume that the small farmer becomes a labour reserve for new industry, but
there is little sign of new industries to fulfil this role.
There appears to be a failure of policy at multiple scales: at the global level policies of
sustainable intensification are framed by a vague understanding of environment and agri-
cultural production in a way which few can question on normative grounds. Who can poss-
ibly be opposed to a policy of sustainable, inclusive, intensification? This policy rhetoric
then interacts with national and local political dynamics which, coupled with limited
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implementation capacity, produces an environment that favours local elite resource
accumulation, and at the same time also encourages the entry of a multitude of donor-
funded actors to compensate for the shortfall in state implementation capacity, creating
a fragmented mess of donor-driven interventions.
Where agricultural intervention does exist, then elite capture at all levels is a frequent
issue, as is illustrated in the example of the Farm Input Subsidy Programme (FISP) of
Zambia. Traditional Authorities and resource allocation committees are frequent sites of
elite capture and potential exploitation. Elite capture may have a gender dimension but
requires explicit consideration of class. This also applies fundamentally to land policy,
where land titling and formalisation may have made it easier for the poorest farmers to
be dispossessed of land. A poorer man is very much more disadvantaged than a wealthier
woman in this regard.
Policy frameworks are dominated by an aid-driven donor discourse. State investment in
agriculture remains limited. Private finance is unaffordable to the small farmer and out-
grower schemes have disappointed many of those involved. Elite and commercial inter-
ests are favoured in legal frameworks and in the normal business of institutional actors.
Markets remain exploitative, hard to access, and unreliable for the small farmer. Exploita-
tion and dispossession of resources are the dominant trends. These trends run entirely
counter to the notion of inclusive sustainable intensification, and significant political
will be required to reverse them. The dynamics of agriculture in Malawi, Tanzania and
Zambia are currently neither sustainable nor inclusive.
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